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Abstract: Opponents of the Affordable Care Act argue that its indi-
vidual mandate component is a “certified job-killer.” In this paper, I
develop a Real Business Cycle model with a search-based labor mar-
ket to test the validity of these concerns. I integrate the individual
mandate into the model and conduct a general equilibrium analysis
of its effects. The simulated results show that the imposition of the
individual mandate regime should result in higher levels of aggregate
employment and output.
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1. Introduction
The recovery from the Great Recession is the slowest post-recession labor market
recovery since the early 1970s. During the period 2009-2014, the U.S. economy
experienced an average annual growth rate of 2.2 percent (FRED, 2016), while the
unemployment rate declined only 0.5 percentage points annually (BLS, 2016). At
the micro-level, employers reluctantly began to post vacancies only after several
years of increased macroeconomic activity (Figure 1). Furthermore, real GDP
recovered to its pre-recession peak in 2 years, but the number of employed work-
ers did not recover to its 2008 high for approximately 5 years (Figure 2). One
frequently-cited explanation for this lagged labor market recovery is the Afford-
able Care Act’s (ACA) individual health insurance mandate. This paper builds a
model that shows the individual mandate had the opposite effect.
In this paper, I derive a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model
of the U.S. economy under the ACA’s individual mandate regime, and then utilize
an applied theoretical simulation to quantify its effects. The model builds upon
Merz’s (1995) theory of a search-based Real Business Cycle (RBC) model. I
add an insurance company to her original model, which allows me to impose the
individual mandate on the model economy. In doing so, this paper contributes to
the growing literature of theoretical macroeconomic analyses of the ACA’s effects
on the U.S. economy. If the derived theory is correct, then the model’s simulation
should produce several results: unemployed workers should increase their search
efforts in order to avoid paying for health insurance; vacancies should increase
as labor supply increases; and consumption should decrease as the unemployed
population must pay insurance premiums. In response, theory predicts aggregate
employment will increase.
The simulated results support the theory. I find that a 1 percent increase in
mandatory health care costs results in a 0.4 percent increase in aggregate employ-
ment and 0.2 percent increase in output. The shock also results in brief increases
in aggregate vacancy postings, search effort, and matches between workers and
2
firms. Additionally, I examine the effects of other shocks in the model to test the
robustness of my findings. Specifically, I introduce stochastic shocks to TFP and
other labor market variables to test for appropriate comovements in the associ-
ated impulse response functions. These analyses serve as robustness checks to my
findings.
I demonstrate the validity of the model through a comparative analysis of U.S.
GDP, consumption, investment, and employment data and the corresponding arti-
ficial time series generated from the model. The artificial time series’ comovements
and volatilities sufficiently match those of the U.S. data. Thus, if my assumptions
about the individual mandate are correct, then I can incorporate the individual
mandate into Merz (1995) and the extended model will also appropriately replicate
the data.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes recent theoretical cost esti-
mations of the ACA. In section 3, I present the model and its associated Social
Planner Problem. I parameterize the model using empirical microeconomic ev-
idence in Section 4. In section 5, I discuss the model’s simulated results, with
an initial comparison of the simulation to the data and then a discussion of the
model’s responses to the imposition of the individual mandate. In section 6, I
draw several conclusions, discuss significant caveats to the results, and present
avenues for future research.
2. Literature Review
The literature focuses on estimating the costs of various ACA policies. Mulligan
(2013) calculates the average increase in marginal tax rates as a result of the ACA.
He examines these policies through a “wedge” framework, which is a measure of
the difference between the employer’s labor costs and the employee’s benefits of
work. On the labor supply side, he finds that for many workers, moving from
full- to part-time work provides workers with approximately the same level of
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disposable income. This results from lower health expenses through ACA subsidies
available exclusively to part-time workers. Furthermore, Mulligan (2014a) notes
that full-time workers whose employers do not provide insurance and instead pay
the penalty do not qualify for ACA subsidies, which further incentivizes them
to move to part-time positions. He also explains that most employers have an
incentive to reduce all but their most productive employees to part-time work,
because they face a weekly 60 dollar penalty per full-time worker as a result of
the ACA.
Mulligan (2014b) uses a similar tax wedge analysis to isolate the effects of the
ACA’s individual mandate under various scenarios. These include the explicit tax
on a firm’s total number of full-time employees and the implicit cost of working
full-time, among others. Building upon his previous work, he allows for hetero-
geneity of hours worked among workers who face similar parameters. On average,
he finds that the individual mandate increases the average marginal earnings tax
rate 1.4 percentage points, and creates a weekly full-time employment cost of 2.1
hours. Gamage (2012) performs similar theoretical analyses and finds a compa-
rable incentive structure: low- and moderate-income households will often reject
full-time jobs, and the ACA will discourage these workers from taking positions at
higher income levels. On the other hand, firms will hire fewer low-income workers,
lower the wages of those they do hire, and shift some low-productivity workers to
part-time positions.
More recent literature focuses on the development of stylized general equilibrium
models of the U.S. economy under the ACA regime. For example, Nakajima and
Tu¨zemen (2015) derive a comprehensive general equilibrium model of the ACA’s
effects on the U.S. economy under the assumption of heterogeneity among workers
and firms. Their model explicitly accounts for firms’ decisions to hire and provide
health insurance, and it distinguishes between full- and part-time work. They
follow Aizawa and Fang (2013), who introduce the concept of medical expense
shocks as a result of workers observing their own stochastically-evolving health
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statuses. Nakajima and Tu¨zemen’s (2015) simulated model reveals that the ACA
primarily affects labor supply, with minimal labor demand effects. They predict
the ACA will increase the proportion of the labor force working part-time from
15.1 to 16.4, which stems almost entirely from the ACA’s tax subsidies as opposed
to the individual mandate and employer penalty. They posit the aggregate effect
of the ACA will be a 0.36 percent decrease in total hours worked.
Other literature focuses on the individual mandate’s effects at the extensive
margin of the labor market. Harris and Mok (2015) argue that the individual
mandate primarily reduces the probability of a worker accepting a job as opposed
to deciding how many hours to work, so its effects at the intensive margin should
be minimal. Their initial analysis concludes that the combination of the negative
substitution and positive income effects should result in a net decrease in aggre-
gate employment of 0.01 percent. This finding comes with strong caveats. Most
importantly, they posit there is a reasonable chance that workers will not respond
to wage reductions stemming from the employer penalty in the same way they
respond to payroll tax deductions. In this scenario, their labor market predictions
would be more optimistic.
This paper provides evidence against these recent negative estimations of the
individual mandate’s labor market effects. I make two contributions to the liter-
ature. First, I develop a new three-agent macroeconomic model that allows me
to isolate the individual mandate’s effects. The literature lacks comprehensive
general equilibrium analyses of the ACA, and so I provide a new foundation for
conducting this research. Second, I contribute to the minimal amount of ACA-
related literature that focuses on the extensive margin of the labor market.1
1 See Harris and Mok (2015) for further discussion.
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3. Economic Theory
The model economy builds upon Merz’s (1995) theory of a search-based labor
market in an RBC framework.2 The base model consists of an infinite number of
workers and firms who attempt to match with each other in the labor market each
period. I add an insurance company to the base model in order to accurately model
the individual mandate’s effects. The inclusion of the insurance company results
in the following portrayal of the labor market. The insurance company supplies
health services Qt to the consumer. A worker’s employment status determines
whether she or her employer pays the insurance costs. Specifically, if a worker
is employed, then her employer pays the entire premium in the form of a per-
worker labor tax. For simplicity, the firm does not have the option of paying a
penalty instead of the premium. If, however, a worker is unemployed, then she
pays her insurance premium to comply with the individual mandate. This scenario
sufficiently captures the mechanics of the ACA’s individual mandate regime.
3.1. Labor Supply
The individual mandate increases the cost of unemployment. If a worker is un-
employed, then she must allocate her time between leisure and searching for a
job, and theory predicts the higher cost of unemployment will induce her to in-
crease her search effort. As aggregate search effort increases, the probability of
an individual worker matching with a firm decreases. The model normalizes the
labor force to one, so a worker who is employed in period t either works in period
t + 1 subject to not separating from her employer (where the exogenous separa-
tion rate is ψt ∈ [0, 1]) or separates from her employer in period t and searches for
employment in period t+ 1. Search effort is endogenous.
2 See Table 1 for a full list of variables and their definitions.
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3.2. Labor Demand
Similarly, firms must engage in a search process for workers. They post job va-
cancies Vt at an exogenous cost a, and do not necessarily match with workers in
a given period. The model assumes that each period firms either: (1) employ
one worker, (2) post a vacancy, or (3) shut down (Andolfatto, 1996). Firms with
a worker in period t operate in the next period with probability 1 − ψt. Firms
without workers in period t operate in period t+ 1 if they match with workers in
period t. Otherwise, they shut down for the period. There is an inverse relation-
ship between the number of firms searching for workers and an individual firm’s
ability to find a match.
3.3. Matching
The number of matches in the labor market Mt depends on the quantity of posted
vacancies and the aggregate search effort St of the unemployed population. The
matching function is:
Mt = V
1−λ
t [St(1−Nt)]λ (1)
where λ ∈ [0, 1].3
3.4. Social Planner Problem
The Social Planner chooses the set {Ct, Nt+1, Kt+1, St, Vt}∞t=0 to maximize the con-
sumer’s lifetime utility function subject to the constraints in the insurance, capital,
labor, and goods markets. The consumer’s lifetime utility function is:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [logCt + log(1−Nt) + logQt] (2)
3 The matching function’s constant returns to scale form is grounded in the literature.
Stevens (2007) demonstrates this in a theoretical derivation of the function under constant
marginal search costs, which this paper uses. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) also observe that
most empirical studies over the last 25 years support this specification.
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate, E0 is the expectations operator conditional
on period 0 information, Ct denotes consumption, and Nt refers to aggregate
employment. The maximization problem is subject to six constraints.
First, the model assumes consumers always receive Q = 1 units of health services
in exchange for the newly-imposed mandatory health care costs ht.
4 The insurance
company faces an endogenous cost Ht per unit of health care provided. Because
the insurance company provides one unit of health each period, I observe that the
insurance company earns zero profit.
Second, the household manages the investment decision subject to the law of
motion for capital:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the exogenous depreciation rate of capital and It is investment.
The household is endowed with an initial capital stock K0.
The next two constraints are the labor market conditions, which consist of the
matching function (Equation 1) and the law of motion for employment:
Nt+1 = (1− ψt)Nt +Mt (4)
Aggregate employment in period t+ 1 depends on matches at the end of period t
and the exogenous separation rate. Note that ψt is defined as an exogenous state
variable as opposed to a parameter, which is more common in the literature.
Fifth, firms produce in accordance with a constant returns to scale Cobb-
Douglas production function:
Yt = ztK
α
t N
1−α
t (5)
4 In assuming perfectly inelastic demand for health care, I can isolate the macroeconomic
effects of the mandatory health insurance costs in the model economy, which are paid regardless
of the quality of an individual consumer’s health insurance plan. The quality of the plan is
irrelevant to short-term analyses, as all insurance plans available through the ACA provide a
sufficient quantity of health care to maintain day-to-day activities. This assumption should
produce a quantitatively larger but qualitatively comparable result to a similar model with
heterogeneous consumers and insurance plans.
8
where α ∈ (0, 1) and zt denotes TFP.5
Sixth, the aggregate feasibility constraint:
Yt = Ct + It + c0St(1−Nt) + ht + aVt (6)
where c0 > 0 is the cost of search effort for the unemployed population. This
equation shows that output is spent on five resources: consumption, investment,
search costs for the unemployed, aggregate health insurance premiums, and costs
associated with vacancy postings.
There are also three exogenous state variables, each assumed to follow AR(1)
stochastic processes: TFP, the separation rate, and health care expenditure. I
define the exogenous state vector Xt = [zt ψt ht]
T . The state vector in period
t is a function of the lagged state vector and the error terms:
Xt = PXt−1 +Qt (7)
where P and Q are 3 x 3 diagonal matrices of coefficients. Each error term is
normally distributed: z ∼ N(0, σ2z), ψ ∼ N(µψ, σ2ψ), and h ∼ N(µh, σ2h).6
5 This functional form is common in the macro-search literature, as it appropriately rep-
resents U.S. national accounts data. Specifically, the parameter α represents the share of U.S.
national income that results from capital income.
6 Technically, the error term on health care expenditure as a share of U.S. output does
not follow a stationary process; however, the model focuses on small linear deviations from the
steady state, so analyzing its responses to small health expense shocks is appropriate.
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3.5. Equilibrium Conditions
Let σt denote a Lagrange multiplier from the associated Social Planner Problem.
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The model economy’s reduced system of first order conditions is:
C−1t c0 = σtλV
1−λ
t [St(1−Nt)]λ−1 (8.1)
aC−1t = σt(1− λ)V −λt [St(1−Nt)]λ (8.2)
C−1t = β
[
αC−1t+1zt+1K
α−1
t+1 N
1−α
t+1 + C
−1
t+1(1− δ)
]
(8.3)
σt = β
[−(1−Nt+1)−1 + C−1t+1 ((1− α)zt+1Kαt+1N−αt+1 + c0St+1)]
+ β
[
σt+1
[
1− ψt+1 − λV 1−λt+1 [St+1(1−Nt+1)]λ−1St+1
]]
(8.4)
Yt = Ct + It + c0St(1−Nt) + ht + aVt (8.5)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (8.6)
Nt+1 = (1− ψt)Nt +Mt (8.7)
Mt = V
1−λ
t [St(1−Nt)]λ (8.8)
Yt = ztK
α
t N
1−α
t (8.9)
log zt+1 = (1− ρz) log z + ρz log zt + z (8.10)
ψt+1 = (1− ρψ)ψ + ρψψt + ψ (8.11)
ht+1 = (1− ρh)h+ ρhht + h (8.12)
where variables without time sub-scripts denote those variables’ steady state val-
ues.
Equations (8.1) and (8.2) are the model economy’s intratemporal conditions;
these equations comprise the decision within a given time period on the optimal
allocation between consumption, vacancy postings, and the search effort of the
unemployed. Equations (8.3) and (8.4) are the two intertemporal conditions, rep-
resenting the decision between time periods on the optimal allocation between
consumption, the capital stock, the employment level, vacancy postings, and the
7 There are initially six Lagrange multipliers; however, four of them equal C−1t and the fifth
equals σt.
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search effort of the unemployed. This allocation strongly relies on the consumer’s
discount rate, β. The remaining equations were discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.
4. Parameterization
I follow the literature and parameterize the model using microeconomic founda-
tions and empirical findings. The parameter values are similar to those used in
Merz (1995); however, I modify them slightly to incorporate findings from more
recent literature. Let Φ denote the vector of parameters from the model economy:
Φ = {α, β, c0, a, δ, λ, ρz, ρψ, ρh, σz, σψ, σh} (9)
Table 2 contains the model’s calibrated parameter values and their definitions.
The parameters α and β represent the economy’s capital income share and the
consumer’s discount rate, respectively. I follow recent literature and let α = 0.36
and β = 0.96, which appropriately accounts for the data at an annual rate. The
depreciation rate of capital δ is regularly set at 0.05 in accordance with Nadiri
and Prucha (1996), who estimate the depreciation rate of capital in the U.S. total
manufacturing sector.
The search and vacancy posting costs are identical to those in Merz (1995).
She sets the search cost parameter c0 to 0.005 in order to generate an equilibrium
unemployment level of 6.1 percent. If this value is too low, then I expect my
results with respect to search effort and employment to be too large, as consumers
will not respond as significantly to higher health care costs. The vacancy cost a is
0.05, which results in an equilibrium vacancy duration that matches van Ours and
Ridder (1992). If this value is too low, then firms will be less inclined to hire in
response to the labor supply increase, so the results with respect to vacancies will
be smaller in magnitude. In either case, the qualitative results will be consistent.
The elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment λ is consistently found
to be in the range 0.4-0.6. Blanchard and Diamond’s (1990) seminal paper on
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the matching function is often cited in the literature, as they find the elasticity of
matches with respect to unemployment and vacancies at 0.4 and 0.6, respectively.
More recently, Anderson and Burgess (2000) find comparable estimates for the
unemployment elasticity in their analysis of the matching function using state-
level data. Thus, I let λ = 0.4 to be consistent with both the macro-search
literature and empirical findings. It is possible that this value is slightly too low,
in which case I expect my vacancy results to be slightly too high, and search effort
and employment results to be slightly too low, though the qualitative results will
not change.
The set of parameters that are associated with the stochastic processes,
{ρz, ρψ, ρh, σz, σψ, σh}, have an irrelevant effect on the simulation’s qualitative re-
sults. For example, higher values of ρh result in the same initial quantitative effect
in the corresponding impulse response functions; however, the shocks’ effects take
longer to dissipate given the higher intertemporal correlations. I define the set of
ρ parameters as ρz = ρψ = 0.95 in order to capture these variables’ high levels
of intertemporal correlation, and ρh = 0.9 because the cost of health care fluc-
tuates more over time. Furthermore, the σ values are also irrelevant because my
goal is to measure 1 percent shocks to the cost of health insurance. Therefore, I
set σz = σψ = σh = 0.01 in my analyses in Section 5.3 so that the simulated 1
standard deviation shocks correspond to 1 percent shocks to the given variables.
5. Simulations and Results
5.1. Empirical Validity
I test the validity of the base model by comparing its simulated time series to
U.S. economic data. This requires the construction of simulated and actual time
series for output, consumption, investment, and employment. To construct the
U.S. time series, I use annual data from FRED (2016) for the period 1959:Q1-
2006:Q4, which makes the data consistent with the set of parameters calibrated
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in Section 4. Notably, the data series also end prior to both the Great Recession
and the implementation of the ACA. I then adjust the variables so that they are
comparable to the respective model variables.8 Finally, I log the four U.S. time
series and detrend them with the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
To construct the simulated time series, I approximate the base model by setting
h = 0. I then calibrate the standard deviation on z to 0.4563 so that the standard
deviation on the simulated output series is identical to that of the U.S. GDP series.
Using the policy functions for output, consumption, investment, and employment
with respect to TFP, I ultimately generate detrended time series using the Hodrick-
Prescott method.
There are multiple comparisons to consider when determining a model’s validity.
Table 3 contains the set of standard deviations associated with the four time series.
The relative second moments of consumption and employment closely match the
data, while the relative volatility of investment is 4 times higher than its empirical
counterpart. RBC models often overestimate the volatility of investment, so I am
not concerned about this statistic.
It is also important to observe the dynamic correlations between output and
the remaining three variables. As seen in the data, investment, consumption, and
employment are each procyclical (Table 4). The procyclicality of consumption and
investment are captured in the simulated model, while the simulated employment
data are countercyclical. This issue arises in many early RBC search models
(Andolfatto, 1996). The impulse response functions for TFP (Figures 5f and 5h)
visually demonstrate the explanation for this negative correlation: following a
positive TFP shock, employment begins to decrease in the initial periods, while
output initially increases as a result of the significant investment increase (Figure
5b). Because I impose accurate assumptions about the individual mandate on
Merz (1995), the results of the extended model should also be consistent with the
data.
8 See Appendix B for a full explanation of this process.
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5.2. Steady State Analyses
I derive the model economy’s steady state, and then assess the changes to the set of
equilibrium values under a range of equilibrium costs of health care. These changes
have significant effects on the model economy’s equilibrium values (Table 5). In
the labor market, these increases result in higher levels of search effort and vacancy
posting. These results follow the theory: the imposition of mandatory health care
costs on the unemployed population increases labor supply, as the relative cost of
unemployment is higher. Firms accommodate these workers by posting more job
vacancies. Thus, the equilibrium increase in aggregate employment increases as
mandatory health care costs rise.
Overall, steady state output increases as equilibrium levels of health care costs
rise (Table 5). There are three explanations for this phenomenon (see Equation
6). First, higher health care costs are associated with increases in investment.
Second, the positive labor market behavior contributes to the aggregate feasi-
bility constraint. Third, the firm’s production must also cover aggregate health
care costs for all consumers, so the significant increases in h should have a strong
positive effect on output. These factors outweigh the negative effect on consump-
tion, which stems from the necessary decrease in consumption for unemployed
consumers.
5.3. Impulse Responses
Using the model economy’s steady state with h = 0.17, I find impulse response
functions in accordance with shocks to the stochastic error terms. There are
several notable results with regards to positive 1 percent shocks to health care
expenditure above its steady state value (Figure 3). Consumption and investment
initially increase -0.4 percent and -4 percent, respectively. The capital stock also
declines, with its minimum value of -0.2 percent below equilibrium occurring in
the tenth period. Aggregate output increases approximately 0.2 percent, which is
due to the positive labor market reactions.
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The labor market’s response to health care shocks are significant and support
the theory. Aggregate vacancies and matches both increase 5 percent in the initial
periods and then revert to their steady state values within 3 periods. As expected,
aggregate search effort also increases 5 percent because workers do not want to pay
the higher mandatory health costs. Additionally, aggregate employment increases
almost 0.4 percent (Figure 3f). This result, in conjunction with the 1 percent
increase in ht, explains the small increase in output associated with positive health
expenditure shocks (Figure 3h).
The model’s responses to positive shocks to ψt are consistent with the theory.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions that correspond to a positive 1
percent shock to the separation rate. These shocks have marginally negative effects
on variables external to the labor market, such as consumption, investment, and
output. Following the theory, most of the labor market variables largely respond
to these shocks. Specifically, vacancies, matches, and search effort each increase
15 percent, and then slowly decline to their equilibrium values in more than 40
periods. Aggregate employment does not respond significantly.
It is also important to note the model’s responses to positive 1 percent shocks
to TFP because it serves as a robustness check to the model’s predictions (Figure
5). These shocks result in nearly 1 percent increases in consumption and the
capital stock, as well as a 6 percent increase in investment prior to the third
period. Interestingly, the impulse response functions for consumption and the
capital stock do not achieve their maximum values until the fifteenth period, and
then they converge to equilibrium in a significant amount of time. Furthermore,
employment initially rises 0.4 percent, while output increases 1.2 percent.
6. Conclusion
This paper develops a three agent search model to test the effects of the ACA’s
individual mandate on the lagged labor market recovery from the Great Recession.
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There are several important results from the simulated model. First, I find that
positive shocks to mandatory health care costs lead to increases in aggregate em-
ployment and output, which opposes recent conclusions in the literature. Second,
I observe that there is a trade-off between consumption and mandatory health
care expenditure, which, in conjunction with the higher cost of unemployment,
provides a general equilibrium explanation for the positive correlation between
equilibrium levels of health care costs and aggregate employment. Third, I simu-
late shocks to the labor market separation rate, and determine that these shocks
have positive effects on vacancies, matches, and search effort, while having min-
imal effects external to the labor market. Fourth, I demonstrate the robustness
of the model using shocks to TFP. The simulated variables comove appropriately
and the artificial time series associated with these shocks sufficiently portray U.S.
economic data.
There are several caveats to the simulated results that stem from my simpli-
fying assumptions about the ACA. I assume homogeneity among consumers and
their options for health insurance, which increases the magnitude of the model’s
results. Additionally, the model focuses on the short-term effects of the individual
mandate, and therefore does not account for the positive long-term effects of uni-
versal health care coverage. Furthermore, the ACA also provides health insurance
subsidies to the unemployed, which diminish the costs imposed on them, but this
should not qualitatively affect my results.
The proposed model provides a new avenue for further cost estimations of
the ACA. Future research should both assume heterogeneity and incorporate the
ACA’s distorting marginal labor taxes into this model. The latter is a relatively
simple task that requires adding a government to the model and including taxes
on labor supply in the consumer’s optimization problem. Another topic for future
research is a welfare analysis of the model economy. Furthermore, future research
should examine the role of expectations in the model. Although the simulated
results indicate there are minimal labor demand distortions stemming from the
16
individual mandate, the model does not fully explain the lagged labor market
recovery. One explanation is firms’ unwillingness to hire workers after the Great
Recession until they understood the mechanics of the law. These news shocks,
in conjunction with the model derived in this paper, could further explain the
post-recession labor market data.
17
References
Aizawa, N. and Fang, H. (2015). Equilibrium labor market search and health
insurance reform. Working Paper 727, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
Anderson, P. M. and Burgess, S. M. (2000). Empirical matching functions: Es-
timation and interpretation using state-level data. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 82(1):93–102.
Andolfatto, D. (1996). Business cycles and labor-market search. American Eco-
nomic Review, 86(1):112–132.
Blanchard, O. J. and Diamond, P. A. (1990). The aggregate matching function.
In Diamond, P. A., editor, Growth/Productivity/Unemployment, pages 159–201.
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016). Labor force statistics from the current popula-
tion survey.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2016). Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED).
Gamage, D. (2012). Perverse incentives arising from the tax provisions of health-
care reform: Why further reforms are needed to prevent avoidable costs to
low-and moderate-income workers. Tax Law Review, 65:669–722.
Harris, E. and Mok, S. (2015). How CBO estimates the effects of the Affordable
Care Act on the labor market. Working Paper 2015-09, Congressional Budget
Office.
Merz, M. (1995). Search in the labor market and the real business cycle. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 36(2):269–300.
Mulligan, C. (2013). Average marginal labor income tax rates under theAffordable
Care Act. Working Paper 19365, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mulligan, C. (2014a). The ACA: Some unpleasant welfare arithmetic. Working
Paper 20020, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Mulligan, C. (2014b). The economics of work schedules under the new hours
and employment taxes. Working Paper 19936, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Nadiri, M. I. and Prucha, I. R. (1996). Estimation of the depreciation rate of
physical and R&D capital in the U.S. total manufacturing sector. Economic
Inquiry, 34(1):43–56.
Nakajima, M. and Tu¨zemen, D. (2015). Health-care reform or labor market re-
form? A quantitative analysis of the Affordable Care Act. Working Paper
15-34, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Petrongolo, B. and Pissarides, C. (2001). Looking into the black box: a survey of
the matching function. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2):390–431.
18
Stevens, M. (2007). New microfoundations for the aggregate matching function.
International Economic Review, 48(3):847–868.
van Ours, J. and Ridder, G. (1992). Vacancies and the recruitment of new em-
ployees. Journal of Labor Economics, pages 138–155.
19
A. Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Aggregate U.S. Job Vacancies (2000-2015)
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Figure 2: Real GDP and Total Nonfarm Employment (2000-2015)
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Parameter Description
Y Output
C Consumption
I Investment
S Search Effort
V Vacancies
K Capital Stock
N Employment
M Matches
Q Quantity of Health Services
z TFP
h Insurance Premium Cost
H Marginal Cost of Health Services
ψ Matches Separation Rate
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
α Capital Income Share 0.36
β Discount Factor 0.96
c0 Worker’s cost of search 0.005
a Cost of Vacancy Post 0.05
δ Capital Depreciation Rate 0.022
λ Matching Function Parameter 0.40
ρz zt Intertemporal Correlation 0.95
ρψ ψt Intertemporal Correlation 0.95
ρh ht Intertemporal Correlation 0.90
Notes: The parameter values are calibrated in Section 4.
Table 3: Volatilities between U.S. and simulated economies
Statistic Observed Data Simulated Data Statistic Observed Data Simulated Data
σY 1.935 1.935 σY /σY 1.000 1.000
σI 4.888 15.807 σI/σY 2.526 8.169
σC 0.677 1.946 σC/σY 0.350 1.006
σN 0.505 1.082 σN/σY 0.261 0.559
Notes: σ represents the standard deviation of the associated time series.
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Table 4: Dynamic correlations between output and other model variables
k
Variable Data Source -2 -1 0 1 2
I Simulated 0.547 0.523 0.628 -0.317 -0.371
Observed -0.297 0.300 0.966 0.191 -0.507
C Simulated -0.581 -0.521 0.435 0.495 0.523
Observed -0.572 -0.466 0.223 0.359 0.246
N Simulated 0.701 0.647 -0.350 -0.403 -0.438
Observed -0.468 -0.059 0.722 0.594 -0.086
Notes: The table’s values are the correlations between the variable in period t
and output in period t− k.
Table 5: Comparison of Steady States Under Varying Levels of h
Steady States
h = 0.00 h = 0.10 h = 0.17 h = 0.20 h = .30 h = 0.40
Y 1.12 1.18 1.23 1.25 1.32 1.38
C 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.85 0.81
I 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17
S 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.24
V 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
K 6.32 6.70 6.96 7.07 7.44 7.82
N 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.52
M 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Notes: Each column corresponds to the set of steady state values under the associ-
ated equilibrium value of h, holding the parameter values constant in each simulation.
Steady state ψ and z are equal to 0.07 and 1, respectively.
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Figure 3: Impulse response functions associated with h
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Notes: The impulse responses are associated with 1 percent shocks to the error term on health
care expenditure. The y-axes are measured in percent deviations from steady state, and the
x-axes denote time periods from the initial shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse response functions associated with ψ
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Notes: The impulse responses are associated with 1 percent shocks to the error term on the labor
market’s separation rate. The y-axes are measured in percent deviations from steady state, and
the x-axes denote time periods from the initial shock.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions associated with z
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Notes: The impulse responses are associated with 1 percent shocks to the error term on TFP.
The y-axes are measured in percent deviations from steady state, and the x-axes denote time
periods from the initial shock.
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B. Data Appendix
I construct time series of output, consumption, investment, and employment using
annual U.S. data from Federal Reserve Economic Data (2016) during the period
1959:Q1-2006:Q4. The variables are constructed as follows:
1. The data series for output consists of real GDP (GDPC1) less government
expenditure (GCEC1) and net exports (NETEXP), as the model is closed
and has no government.
2. I define consumption as the sum of services consumed (PCES), non-
durable goods consumed (PCND), and 4 percent of durable goods consumed
(PCEDG). I multiply the latter by 4 percent because that is the rate used
in the literature at which durable goods are consumed annually.
3. In the model, employment is measured as a rate, so I define the employment
time series as the annual civilian employment rate for all persons in the U.S.
ages 25-54 (LREM25TTUSA156N).
4. The investment time series consists of the sum of Real Investment (GPDICA)
and Durables consumed (PCEDG).
26
